Bandwagon voting or false-consensus effect in voting experiments? : First results and methodological limits by Bischoff, Ivo & Egbert, Henrik
Zentrum für internationale Entwicklungs- und Umweltforschung 
der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen 
 
 
 
 
Bandwagon voting or false-consensus effect 
in voting experiments?  
First results and methodological limits 
von 
Ivo Bischoff* and Henrik Egbert# 
 
Nr. 38 
This version Gießen, December 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Professur für  
Öffentliche Finanzen 
Justus-Liebig Universität 
Licher Str. 74 
35394 Gießen 
Tel.: 0641 / 99-22084 
Ivo.Bischoff@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de 
# Professur für Verhaltens- und 
Institutionenökonomik 
Justus-Liebig Universität 
Licher Straße 66 
35394 Gießen 
Tel.: 0641 / 99-22202 
henrik.egbert@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de 
 
  
  I 
CONTENT 
 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................1 
2.  Bandwagon behaviour and the false consensus effect in voting.......................2 
3. Experimental set-up ..........................................................................................5 
4. Hypotheses.......................................................................................................7 
5. Results ..............................................................................................................9 
6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................18 
7. References......................................................................................................19 
 
II 
  III 
ABSTRACT 
In an experiment designed to test for expressive voting, Tyran (JPubEc 2004) 
found a strong positive correlation between the participants’ approval for a 
proposal to donate money for charity and their expected approval rate for fellow 
voters. This phenomenon can be due to bandwagon voting or a false 
consensus effect. The social science literature reports both ef-fects for voting 
decisions. Replicating Tyran’s experiment and adding new treatments, we 
provide evidence for a false consensus effect but find no support for 
bandwagon voting. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In a series of voting experiments, Tyran (2004) reports on an interesting pattern 
of behaviour. He finds a strong positive correlation between a voter’s decision to 
vote for a certain proposal and her individual expectations with respect to the 
approval rate of her fellow-voters. Though accompanied by a note of caution, 
Tyran suggests that this pattern is consistent with bandwagon behaviour. This 
behaviour is observed in economic experiments and social psychology studies. 
In this paper, we argue that the false-consensus effect provides an equally 
plausible explanation for the observed correlation. We modify the experimental 
set-up by Tyran (2004) and run a number of experimental sessions involving a 
total of 326 subjects to test both explanations. Similar to Tyran (2004) we attain 
the same strong correlation between voter’s expectations and their own 
behaviour. However we find no evidence for a bandwagon effect. We conclude 
that the correlation is caused by a false consensus effect. The paper is 
organized as follows: After a brief literature review in section 2, section 3 
presents the experimental set-up. The hypotheses are laid out in section 4, 
followed by the presentation of results in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 
2.  BANDWAGON BEHAVIOUR AND THE FALSE CONSENSUS 
EFFECT IN VOTING 
Bandwagon behaviour is observed in different fields of human behaviour. We 
observe bandwagon behaviour of consumers but also of producers (e.g., 
Leibenstein, 1950; Henshel and Johnston, 1987; Banerjee, 1992). In political 
decisions, bandwagon behaviour is related to voting decisions. It means that a 
voter is more likely to vote in favour of (against) a proposal the more of her 
fellow-voters she expects to vote in favour of (against) it. This behaviour may 
either be motivated by a positive utility from voting along with the crowd or an ex 
post utility from being with the winners. Alternatively, it may be motivated by the 
assumption that the majority of her fellow voters has relevant information that is 
not available to her but that would convince her to vote accordingly if she had it. 
Thus, bandwagon voting reflects a motive different from instrumental (Downs, 
1957) and expressive ones (Brennan and Lomansky 1993; Brennan and 
Hamlin, 1998). Regardless of the motive, bandwagon voting indicates that the 
voter’s expectations drive her behaviour. Mehrabian (1998) presents two 
studies in which he uses bogus polls to study the influence of the bandwagon 
effect in voting. In his first study, he elicits the intended voting behaviour among 
Republicans in their primaries for the presidential election in 1996. He finds that 
the tendency to prefer Bob Dole over Steve Forbes depends on the polls 
presented to the voters. Voters are more likely to vote for Dole when Dole leads 
in the opinion poll compared to the situation with Forbes leading. The second 
study involves students from the University of California, Los Angeles. These 
are asked to express their approval to proposals for different modes of testing 
their performance: a midterm exam and the possibility to write an extra-credit 
paper. Results show that bogus polls do not influence the answers when the 
participants have clear and strong preferences but they do have an impact 
when preference relations are weak. In this case, bandwagon voting is 
observed. Mehrabian’s (1998) result is in line with the findings of Ansolabehere 
and Iyengar (1994) for presidential and senate elections in California in 
1992/1993, and of Schmitt-Beck (1996) for the German national election in 
December 1990. 
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While bandwagon effects assume that expectations drive behaviour, some 
authors report evidence for the reverse direction of causality. Lemert (1986) 
argues that individuals who are not experts in the field of politics are likely to fall 
victim of a false consensus effect (see also Pronin et al., 2002).
1
 It is caused by 
the fact that “[i]n the absence of strong counter-forces, a large proportion of 
people feel that the world they live in agrees with their own opinion on public 
issues” (Fields and Schuman, 1976: 445). For this direction of causality Lemert 
(1986) provides empirical evidence from the elections in Oregon in the 1980s. 
He shows that voters are over-optimistic when predicting the share of voters 
that vote along with them. Babad (1995) finds similar results in a study on 
voters’ decisions in the general election in Israel 1992. The false consensus 
effect is found for situations where individuals have to infer the preferences of 
others (e.g., gift-selection among spouses). Individuals tend to anchor on their 
own preferences and to a substantial degree ignore the fact that others have 
different preferences (e.g., Davis et al., 1986; West, 1996). 
In line with principles in experimental economics, Tyran (2004)
2
 conducts a 
laboratory experiment on voter behaviour that does not elicit voters’ intentions. 
Instead, the experiment allows to observe voting decisions in situations with 
monetary incentives. Furthermore, he does not rely on bogus polls to control 
voters’ expectations. His experiment is motivated by the theory of expressive 
voting and implements Tullocks thought experiment on the charity of the 
uncharitable (e.g. Tullock, 1971; see also Carter and Guerette, 1992; Fischer, 
1996 ). In Tyran’s experiment subjects receive a monetary endowment and they 
are asked to vote on a proposal to donate their endowment to charity. They can 
only decide to donate their entire endowment or to keep it. Vote abstention is 
not possible. Subjects can observe and estimate the size of the group, i.e. the 
number of their fellow voters. They are informed about the rule that the proposal 
is accepted if the overall approval rate a exceeds a public announced quorum 
                                            
1
  The false consensus effect is also called looking glass effect (e.g., Fields and Schuman, 
1976) and sometimes described as wishful thinking (e.g., Lemert 1986). 
2
  Tyran (2004) uses two different treatments in his study. Here, we focus on his treatment T1 
only. 
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Q, else it is rejected. All subjects keep their money regardless of their individual 
decision if a ≤ Q. If a > Q, the endowment of all subjects is donated, regardless 
of the individual vote. For a given donation purpose five different values of Q 
(1 %, 25 %, 50 %, 75 %, 99 %) are used. Thus, all subjects have to take five 
votes. The subjects have no possibility to learn about the voting behaviour of 
other group members because all five votes are taken simultaneously. Subjects 
are informed that only one of the five voting decisions is finally chosen at 
random and executed. Before voting for or against the proposal, each subject i 
is asked to state the expected overall approval rate âij for each quorum Qj (j = 1, 
…, 5). In order to induce incentives to make a thoughtful guess, the participant 
whose expectations are closest to the real rates is granted an extra payment of 
approximately 3 €. In his experiment, 56.4 % of participants vote instrumentally, 
meaning that they either vote YES on all quora or NO on all quora. The 
remaining 43.6 % vote YES on some quora and NO on others, i.e. participants 
switch their decisions. Among these so-called switchers
3
, the subjects’ decision 
to vote YES on a certain quorum is strongly and positively correlated with the 
expected approval rate of others for this quorum. The same correlation is found 
for the group of subjects as a whole. Though accompanied with a note of 
caution, Tyran suggests that these results may be caused by bandwagon 
behaviour. However, the observed correlation is equally well explained by the 
false consensus effect. In the following section, we present an experimental set-
up that is suitable to test for bandwagon behaviour. Our design follows Tyran 
(2004) by and large but adds new treatments. 
                                            
3
 Only a small fraction of these switchers show behaviour consistent with expressive voting. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 
Our experiment involves five sessions with five different groups. The groups are 
similar with respect to age and sex composition, as well as educational 
background of the participants. The participants of each group sit in one room 
so that they can see their fellow-players and estimate their number. The 
instructions are given in written form and communication is prohibited 
throughout the experiment. We answer arising questions on the instructions in 
private with the individual. At the end of each session, the participants fill in a 
questionnaire on biographical information and a number of other questions 
related to the voting experiment. One session lasts about 40 minutes and the 
participants have the chance to earn 10 €. 
The first block of experiments involves three treatments (T-control, T-estimate, 
T-information) and is performed in summer 2008 at the Justus-Liebig-University 
Giessen, Germany with 165 first year students majoring in economics and 
management science. At the beginning of the session, we endow the subjects 
with a voucher worth 10 €. Each session then involves four times three voting 
rounds with the following four issues: 
(1) Adult illiteracy: donation of 10 € for a national non-profit organisation fighting 
adult illiteracy. 
(2) Disabled children: donation of 10 € for a national non-profit organisation 
offering recreational activities for disabled children. 
(3) Civil war refugees: donation of 10 € for an international non-profit 
organisation helping refugees from civil wars. 
(4) Corruption: donation of 10 € for an international non-profit organisation 
fighting corruption. 
For each issue k (k = 1, … 4) we provide three quora (Qjk for j = 1, …, 3).  
Like in Tyran (2004), only one of the 12 voting rounds is chosen at random and 
executed. If the approval rate in the chosen round is lower than the quorum, all 
subjects can cash in their voucher after the experiment. Otherwise the 10 € of 
all subjects are donated to a non-profit organisation of the type stated in the 
ballot. In treatment T-control, subjects go through the 12 voting rounds without 
being asked any additional questions and they do not receive additional 
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information. Subjects in treatments T-estimate and T-information have to make 
the same 12 voting decision as subjects in T-control. Under T-estimate, each 
subject i is asked to state her estimated approval rate among her fellow 
participants âijk before she casts her vote. Under T-information we inform 
subjects – before they take their vote – about the approval rate ājk observed in 
T-control for each voting round. We also inform them that this type of 
information is usually a good predictor for the behaviour in later ballots on the 
same topic conducted among similar groups of participants. 
In autumn 2008, we perform a second block of sessions with two additional 
treatments T-information-2 and T-information-3 involving 161 students majoring 
in economics or management science. Rules are identical to those in T-
information. The subjects are informed about the approval rates ājk observed in 
the first block of experiments. While we inform the subjects of T-information-2 
about the approval rate among students majoring in economics, subjects in T-
information-3 are informed about the approval rates of management science 
students. Again, information is not bogus but each group gets true feedback 
about the approval rates of the relevant subgroup calculated from the first three 
sessions and subjects know that the ājk are calculated from these subgroups. 
For both T-information-2 and T-information-3, we add a number of questions to 
our post-experimental questionnaire. In particular, we ask whether the 
participants had strong a priori expectations about the approval rates of their 
fellow-participants and if so, whether these were largely in line with the 
presented values or not.  
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4. HYPOTHESES 
Before testing for bandwagon voting and false consensus effect, we compare 
the voting behaviour across the sessions in the first block. Given the similar 
composition of all three groups of subjects, there is no ex ante reason to 
expect differences in the approval rates. If we do find a treatment effect for T-
estimate, the external validity of our experiment and the one of Tyran (2004) 
has to be questioned because in typical elections and ballots, voters are not 
explicitly asked to state their expectations concerning their fellow voters’ 
behaviour before casting their vote.  
Given our special focus on the hypotheses that help to identify bandwagon 
voting and false consensus effects, we first analyse the results of T-estimate. 
We proceed in two steps. First, we test for the correlation between âijk and the 
expected approval rate among fellow-voters. A positively significant 
correlation is a necessary precondition for the existence of bandwagon voting 
and false consensus effect alike. Thus, we formulate hypothesis H1: 
Individual approval rates increase with âijk . Second, we look at the distribution 
of the âijk. Consider an individual voter i who falls victim of the false 
consensus effect. When estimating âijk she will anchor on her own voting 
intention and overestimate the degree to which her fellow-voters share this 
intention. If she intends to approve, she overestimates âijk and she 
underestimates âijk if she intends to reject the proposal. Calling an individual 
who vote YES on a certain issue a YES-respondent, we arrive at hypothesis 
H2: The âijk of YES-respondents is higher than the actual approval rate. 
Consequently, hypothesis H3 states: The âijk of NO-respondents is lower than 
the actual approval rate. However, this observation is equally consistent with 
bandwagon voting. In this case, voter i does not anchor on her own 
preferences but makes a more or less informed guess about how her fellow-
voters will decide. The higher the estimate for âijk she arrives at is, the more 
likely she is to approve – provided bandwagon motives are important for her. 
When dividing the subjects into YES-respondents and NO-respondents ex 
post, above-average estimates for âijk among the former and below-average 
estimates among the latter indicate that bandwagon motives matter for a 
substantial share of participants. Thus, evidence in favour of hypotheses H2 
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and H3 supports the notion that bandwagon voting and/or false consensus 
effects drive the results in T-estimate. 
To differentiate between the two effects, analysing the âijk leaves us with a 
rather weak indirect test. We can compare the estimates and the estimation 
errors of YES-respondents between instrumental voters and bandwagon-like 
voters. In T-estimate, a subject exhibits bandwagon-like behaviour for a certain 
issue k if she votes YES for the highest value of âijk and NO for the lowest value 
on this issue. If estimates are driven by a false consensus effect only, there is 
no reason to expect a significant difference between the estimates (respectively 
estimation errors) of instrumental and bandwagon-like voters. If, however, 
expectations drive voting behaviour (as implied by bandwagon voting), the âijk of 
bandwagon-like YES-respondents are expected to be larger than estimates of 
instrumental YES-respondents. The opposite relation is expected among NO-
respondents. Thus, we arrive at hypothesis H4: The âijk of YES-respondents 
among the bandwagon-like voters is higher than among âikj of YES-
respondents. Consequently, hypothesis H5 states: The âijk of NO-respondents 
among the bandwagon-like voters is higher than among âijk of NO-respondents. 
A second test for bandwagon voting may address differences between T-
estimate and T-information. Similarities in the voting behaviour across 
treatments are likely to result from similar preferences and cannot provide 
evidence for a bandwagon effect. We can only analyse differences between 
approval rates in T-estimate and T-information for those cases, when the 
average âijk in T-estimate differs significantly from ājk in T-information. This 
leads to hypothesis H6: When the average âijk in T-estimate is significantly 
higher (lower) than the ājk in T-information, the approval rates in T-estimate are 
higher (lower) than in T-information. 
In order to perform an adequately strong test to differentiate between both 
effects, it is necessary to observe two similar groups of subjects deciding on an 
identical issue but – by an exogenous intervention – provide them with 
systematically different estimates for âijk. If the approval rates do not differ, 
bandwagon voting does not show. In this case, evidence is in line with 
hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 and can be interpreted as evidence for a false 
consensus effect only. If, on the other hand, we observe the approval rate to be 
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higher in the group with the higher estimates, we can conclude that bandwagon 
motives are present. This result does not imply that no false consensus effect 
exists. The latter can still drive the estimates of subjects in all cases like in T-
estimate where estimates are not exogenously given. In other words, our test to 
differentiate between the two effects essentially means that we test for the 
existence of bandwagon voting. Accordingly, we arrive at our final hypothesis 
H7: For all decisions where there is a difference between ājk in T-information-2 
and T-information-3, the approval rate is larger in the group for which ājk is 
larger. 
 
5. RESULTS 
First block of sessions (T-control, T-estimate, T-information) 
The overall approval rates and the frequency of switching for the first three 
treatments (T-control, T-estimate, T-information) are shown in table 1 and 2.  
Table 1: Voting outcomes in T-control, T-estimate, T-information 
  Approval rates [%] 
Type of 
charity 
Quorum 
T-control 
n=51a 
T-estimate 
n=59a 
T-information 
n=55a 
10% 45.1 50.9 30.9 
50% 51.0 49.2 49.1 
Adult  
Illiteracy 
70% 41.2 45.8 52.7 
5% 52.9 67.2 50.9 
50% 66.7 81.4 70.9 
Disabled 
Children 
80% 58.8 63.8 63.0 
25% 38.0 47.5 41.8 
50% 38.0 45.8 43.6 
Civil War  
Refugees 
90% 44.0 46.6 50.9 
10% 41.2 39.3 29.6 
50% 39.2 37.5 34.6 Corruption 
75% 43.1 35.7 43.6 
a Sample sizes can differ slightly from the denoted values due to non-
responses. 
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Compared to Tyran (2004), approval rates and the share of switchers are 
slightly higher in our experiment. Table 2 also reports the share of bandwagon-
like voters. Within each of the four issues, we define a bandwagon-like voter to 
be a subject who approves in the decision where the expected approval rate 
(âijk respectively ājk) is maximum and rejects the proposal where it is at its 
minimum. In both T-estimate and T-information, these subjects constitute more 
than half of the switchers and about one third of all subjects. 
Table 2: Switching behaviour and bandwagon-like voting 
Type of 
Charity 
Share of switchers among all 
voters [%] 
Share of bandwagon-like 
voters among all voters 
[%] 
 T-control 
n=51a 
T-estimate 
n=59a 
T-information 
n=55a 
T-estimate 
n=59a 
T-information 
n=55a 
Adult  
Illiteracy 
49.0 51.7 56.4 27.1 16.4 
Disabled 
Children 
49.0 42.1 55.6 31.6 23.3 
Civil War 
Refugees 
48.0 38.6 56.4 29.8 16.7 
Corruption 45.1 38.2 53.7 25.5 21.8 
All issues 47.8 42.7 55.5 28.5 19.6 
a Sample sizes can differ slightly from the denoted values due to non-responses. 
In search for possible treatment effects, we perform a pair-wise comparison of 
the approval rates reported in table 1. No significant differences are observed 
(Binomial test, p = 0.05). An ANOVA across all 12 voting rounds yielded no 
treatment effect either (F-test, p = 0.05). By the same method, we find no 
treatment effect when comparing T-control and T-estimate. The comparison of 
the share of switchers does not yield significant differences across treatments 
either. The absence of treatment effects indicates that presenting information 
for the fellow-participants’ behaviour or asking subjects to provide estimates for 
the latters’ behaviour does not change aggregated approval rates nor the 
frequency of switching.  
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Table 3 reports on the Spearman correlation between âijk and the individual 
approval rates for the participants in T-estimate. They are positive and 
significant for 11 out of 12 voting rounds (Hotelling-Pabst test, p = 0.05). Among 
switchers and instrumental voters, we observe a significantly positive correlation 
for most issues. 
Table 3:  Spearman correlation between âijk and individual voting 
decision in T-estimate 
Type of 
Charity 
 
Quorum 
all 
participants 
Non-switcher switchers 
10% 0.520*** 0.640*** 0.443*** 
50% 0.469*** 0.599*** 0.247 
Adult 
Illiteracy 
70% 0.606*** 0.622*** 0.574*** 
5% 0.405*** 0.245 0.676*** 
50% 0.374*** 0.252 0.583*** 
Disabled 
Children 
 80% 0.503*** 0.396** 0.538*** 
25% 0.259** 0.158 0.499*** 
50% 0.213 0.201 0.222 
Cvil War 
Refugees 
90% 0.377*** 0.259 0.494*** 
10% 0.318*** 0.048 0.640*** 
50% 0.412*** 0.331** 0.492*** Corruption 
75% 0.442*** 0.492*** 0.299 
** significant at the 5 % level *** significant at the 1 % level (one-tailed) 
 Table 4:  Mean approval rates âijk in treatment T-estimate and frequencies of overestimation by YES- and NO-
respondents 
mean âijk among them among them 
Voting round 
actual 
approval 
rate  
All  
respondents
YES-res-
pondents 
NO-res-
pondents 
n 
number of 
YES-res-
pondents 
number of  
overestimations
(%) 
number of 
NO-res-
pondents 
number of  
overestimations
(%) 
Share of 
overestimation 
in line with 
one’s decision 
All rounds 51.0 43.7*** 54.5*** 32.7*** 693 352 201*** 57.1 341 76*** 22.3 67.2*** 
10% 50.9 35.7** 50.6 n 20.3*** 59 30 18 60.0 29 1*** 03.4 78.0*** 
50% 49.2 44.2n 53.8 n 35.3n ** 58 28 17 60.7 30 4*** 13.3 74.1*** 
Adult 
Illiteracy
70% 45.8 51.0 n 66.2 n*** 38.3n ** 59 27 22*** 81.5 32 13 40.6 69.5*** 
5% 67.2 44.4** 54.6 23.3*** 58 39 20 51.3 19 1*** 05.3 65.5** 
50% 81.4 51.1n*** 54.6 n ** 36.1 n ** 59 48 3*** 6.3 11 0*** 00.0 23.7 
Dis-
abled 
Children
80% 63.8 60.9 n 70.0 n 44.8 n ** 58 37 27*** 73.0 21 5** 23.8 74.1*** 
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Table 4 cont. 
mean âijk among them among them 
Voting round 
actual 
approval 
rate  
All  
respondents
YES-res-
pondents 
NO-res-
pondents 
n 
number of 
YES-res-
pondents 
number of  
overestimations
(%) 
number of 
NO-res-
pondents 
number of  
overestimations
(%) 
Share of 
overestimation 
in line with 
one’s decision 
25% 47.5 34.9*** 40.4 30.0*** 58 27 11 40.7 31 6*** 19.4 62.1 
50% 45.8 42.5 47.1 n 38.6n ** 59 27 15 55.6 32 11 34.4 61.0 
Civil War
Refugees
90% 46.6 52.4 n 64.0 n ** 42.4 n 58 27 20** 74.1 31 13 41.9 65.5** 
10% 39.3 28.1*** 41.4 n 19.9*** 55 21 10 47.6 34 4*** 11.8 72.7*** 
50% 37.5 37.3 n 45.8 n ** 32.2 n 56 21 16** 76.2 35 15 42.9 64.3** 
Corrup-
tion 
75% 35.7 41.2 n 54.7 n ** 33.7 n 56 20 15** 75.0 36 15 41.7 64.3** 
n = normality test passed (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff-test, p = 0.05); ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level, 
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Like Tyran (2004), we find strong support for hypothesis H1. Table 4 contains 
the mean âijk in T-estimate and the frequency of overestimation among YES- 
and NO-respondents for all 12 voting rounds and in total. With respect to 
hypothesis H2, we find the âijk to exceed the actual approval rate eight out of 
twelve cases with four cases of them being significant. In one case, we found a 
significant underestimation among YES-respondents (t-test for normally 
distributed estimates, sign-test in the other cases, p = 0.05). For hypothesis H3, 
we find that the mean âijk among the NO-respondents always falls short of the 
actual approval rate. In nine out of twelve cases, the difference is significant (t-
test for normally distributed estimates, sign-test in the other cases, p = 0.05).
4
 In 
sum, our evidence supports hypothesis H2 and H3. 
Coming to hypothesis H4 and H5, we compare the âijk for YES- and NO-
respondents among bandwagon-like and instrumental voters. Given the small 
number of observations for the single voting rounds, we perform a two-way 
ANOVA on all voting rounds. We do not find a significant difference between the 
âijk among bandwagon-like and instrumental voters for both NO and YES-
respondents (F-test, p = 0.05). Thus, hypotheses H4 and H5 are not supported. 
Hypothesis H6 can be tested for only one voting round (Disabled children 50 %) 
in which the mean âijk (51.3 %) among all respondents (T-estimate) differs 
significantly from the approval rate ājk (66. 7 %) reported to the subjects in T-
information (Binomial test, p = 0.05). In case of a bandwagon effect, we would 
expect the approval rate in T-information to be higher than under T-estimate. In 
fact, however, we find the opposite to be true (Binomial test, p = 0.05). Thus, in 
sum, the results of the first sessions leave us with only weak tests to show  
bandwagon voting. By these test, we find no evidence for bandwagon voting. 
 
                                            
4
  Across all 12 voting rounds, the overall frequency of overestimation among YES-
respondents (NO-respondents) amounts to 57.1 % (22.3 %) which is significantly higher 
(lower) than 50 % (Binomial test, p = 0.05). Pooling all subjects and voting rounds, we find 
the frequency (277 out of 693) is significantly lower than 50 %.  
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Second block of sessions (T-information-2, T-information-3) 
We introduce two additional sessions, T-information-2 and T-information-3, in 
order to base the test on a broad empirical basis. Table 5 shows the approval 
rates and table 6 informs about the share of switchers and bandwagon-like 
voters. The share of switchers is slightly higher than in the first three treatments 
while the share of bandwagon-like voters is slightly lower. Nevertheless, the 
latter still account for an important share of all voters. We do not find a 
treatment effect with respect to the share of switchers or bandwagon-like voters 
(Binomial test, p = 0.05).  
Table 5:  Voting outcomes for T-information-2 and T-information-3 
  ājk Approval rates [%] 
Type of 
Charity Quorum T-information-2 T-information-3
T-information-2 
n=81a 
T-information-3
n=80a 
10% 83 14 44.3 31.3* 
50% 67 29 51.9 43.3 
Adult  
Illiteracy 
70% 50 43 56.3 54.4 
5% 92 55 58.2 51.9 
50% 83 74 66.7 65.0 
Disabled 
Children 
80% 75 61 65.0 62.0 
25% 33 39 33.3 44.3 
50% 33 32 43.0 48.8 
Civil War 
Refugees 
90% 50 45 51.3 41.8 
10% 50 50 36.3 24.1* 
50% 25 50 26.9 29.1 
Corruption 
75% 25 63 35.4 40.0 
* significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level *** significant at the 
1 % level 
a Sample sizes can differ slightly from the denoted values due to non-
responses. 
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Table 6: Switching behaviour and bandwagon-like voting 
Share of switchers  
among all voters [%] 
Share of bandwagon-like 
voters among all voters [%] Type of 
Charity T-information-2 
n=81a 
T-information-3 
n=80a 
T-information-2 
n=81a 
T-information-3 
n=80a 
Adult  
Illiteracy 
58.4 64.6 18.8 41.3 
Disabled  
Children 
57.2 54.6 20.0 21.3 
Civil War 
Refugees 
57.2 51.9 18.4 12.5 
Corruption 48.7 55.6 18.4 17.7 
All issues 55.4 56.7 18.9 23.2 
a Sample sizes can differ slightly from the denoted values due to non-responses. 
 
By differentiating between the approval rates of economics and management 
science students in T-control, T-estimate, T-information, we provide subjects in 
T-information-2 and T-information-3 with values for ājk that differ substantially 
for some voting rounds but are similar for others (see table 5).
5
 However, 
pairwise comparison’s of the approval rate across voting rounds and treatments 
does not yield any significant differences at the 5 % level (Binomial test, 
p = 0.05). At the 10 % level, we find significant differences for two voting rounds 
with the first being in line with hypothesis H7 and the other one contradicting it. 
Even when we pool the three decisions on the issue Illiteracy where the 
difference in ājk is substantial and then compare the overall approval rate across 
treatments, we find the difference to be only weakly significant (Binomial test, 
p = 0.1). 
Given that we inform the subjects about the samples from which the ājk are 
drawn and given that the largest part of subjects in T-information-2 and T-
                                            
5
  We calculated the approval rates among economics and management science students in 
T-control, T-estimate, T-information and selected the values from all three sessions to 
presented in table 1. It has to be noted that the number of economics students is much 
smaller than the number of students of management science. 
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information-3 are majoring in management science, one might argue that the ājk 
calculated from economics students lack credibility. We account for this fact by 
asking the participants in a post-experimental questionnaire whether they had 
strong a priori expectations concerning the āj that are not in line with the 
actually reported values. This was the case for only 4 respectively 7 subjects 
out of 81 respectively 80. The others either reported to have had strong a priori 
expectations that are in line with the reported values or reported not to have had 
strong a priori expectations. Restricting our test of hypothesis H7 to these other 
subjects does not yield any differences in approval rates (Binomial test, 
p = 0.05). Following the suggestion of Mehrabian (1998), we also account for 
the subjects’ preferences concerning the purpose for which the donated money 
is to be used. On a 4-point scale, we asked them whether they consider the 
purpose very important, important, rather unimportant or unimportant. 
Mehrabian (1998) argues that bandwagon voting is more likely when individuals 
do not have clear and strong preferences on the issue at hand. Thus, we rerun 
the test excluding all individuals who answered either very important or 
unimportant. Again, we find no significant differences among the remaining 
individuals. Finally, we use our post-experimental questionnaire to isolate those 
subjects with limited information concerning the organisations that potentially 
receive the donated money. In one test, we only include individuals who cannot 
name an organisation of the type they are deciding about. In a second test, we 
exclude all individuals who declare their level of information on the issue at 
hand to be high. The rationale behind this test is that an individual who has 
limited information is more likely to vote along with the majority for reasons of 
informational herding. We find no significant differences between treatments in 
the first test while we find a significant difference for the first voting round in the 
second test (Binomial test, p = 0.05). Here, the approval rate was 48.2 % in T-
information-2 (n = 58) and 29.0 % in T-information-3 (n = 62).
6
 In sum, however, 
our empirical evidence contradicts hypothesis H7. 
                                            
6
  Given the limited space, we do not report the tables for the robustness checks. They are 
available with the authors upon request.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented an experiment to test for bandwagon and false 
consensus effects in voting experiments like the one presented by Tyran 
(2004). Redoing his experiment, we observe the same strong positive 
correlation between the participants’ approval to a proposal to donate money for 
charity and their expected approval rate for fellow voters observed by Tyran 
(2004). Our analysis shows that it is caused by a false consensus effect: When 
estimating the expected approval rate for their fellow voters, participants anchor 
on their own voting intentions and make predictions that overestimate the 
degree to which others follow the same intentions. Thus, the participants’ voting 
intentions drive their expectations.  
The reverse causality is implied by the bandwagon effect: Wanting to vote along 
with the majority, participants base their voting decision on the expected 
approval rate for fellow-voters. However, our results do not provide any 
evidence for the existence of bandwagon motives. At the same time, the fact 
that we follow the experimental tradition in economics by not giving false 
feedback (e.g. in the form of bogus polls) leaves us with only very weak tests for 
bandwagon voting in the first place. Thus, we by no means interpret our result 
as contradicting the empirical evidence produced by Ansolabehere and Iyengar 
(1994) and the other authors named in section 2. The fact that we do not find 
any evidence for bandwagon voting does not mean that bandwagon motives do 
not play an important role in voting. One possible explanation for our results is 
that false consensus and bandwagon effect interact: First, voters overestimate 
the degree to which others share their policy preferences. Second, based on 
these biased beliefs, they believe to vote along with the majority when in fact 
they only vote along with themselves. In any case, the matter is far from being 
settled and further research is needed.  
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